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Abstract One of the deepest ideological divides in contemporary epistemology con-
cerns the relative importance of belief versus credence. A prominent consideration in
favor of credence-based epistemology is the ease with which it appears to account for
rational action. In contrast, cases with risky payoff structures threaten to break the link
between rational belief and rational action. This threat poses a challenge to traditional
epistemology, which maintains the theoretical prominence of belief. The core prob-
lem, we suggest, is that belief may not be enough to register all aspects of a subject’s
epistemic position with respect to any given proposition. We claim this problem can
be solved by introducing other doxastic attitudes—genuine representations—that dif-
fer in strength from belief. The resulting alternative picture, a kind of doxastic states
pluralism, retains the central features of traditional epistemology—most saliently, an
emphasis on truth as a kind of objective accuracy—while adequately accounting for
rational action.
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Introduction
Consider the following case:
car insurance: Your car insurance company offers you a deal. The offer is to
insure your car for the next five years against theft for the nominal price of ten
dollars. You do not live in circumstances where car theft is particularly prevalent.
It is rational for you to believe that your car will not be stolen during the next
five years. But, of course, car theft has been known to happen on rare occasion
nearby. And, you do not consider yourself to be especially different from the
owners of those stolen cars.
Cases like car insurance appear to diminish the importance of rational belief, and
this is because it seems you are rational to act in opposition to what you rationally
believe is the all-things-considered best thing to do. After all, you believe that your car
will not be stolen and also that, if your car will not be stolen, the insurance won’t be
needed; and further, you believe that it would be best not to spend money on insurance
if it isn’t needed. Accordingly, you believe that it would be best not to spend money on
car insurance. Nevertheless, you rationally purchase the insurance.1 This kind of case
appears to show that the link between rational belief and rational action is broken; one
cannot straightforwardly decide what to do on the basis of what one (even rationally)
believes to be best.2
In contrast, rational credence appears to do much better here. Of course, you may
rationally believe that your car will not be stolen—and thus believe that if you purchase
the insurance, the end result will simply be less money for other things. However, if
you are rational, you have at least some minimal credence in the proposition that
your car will be stolen. The rationality of this minimal credence (along with the
rationality of your preferences) can explain why it’s rational to purchase the insur-
ance.3
Cases such as car insurance might seem to suggest that what is fundamental
in epistemology is credence (alternatively known as “degrees of belief”) rather than
belief. Perhaps the epistemology of belief might be important for reasons that aren’t
directly related to action, but a divorce between rational belief and rational action at
least greatly diminishes the importance of having the capacity to believe rationally.
The project of this paper is to explain why this threat to traditional epistemology—
epistemology that focuses primarily on belief—may not be as severe as it first appears.
The advantage that a credence framework has in accounting for rational action might
1 Thanks to an anonymous referee at Synthese for helpful suggestions regarding the presentation of this
case.
2 We ignore here the possibility that one has beliefs about probabilities, e.g. a rational belief that there is a
very small chance the car will be stolen. Cf. Stanley (2005, p. 10). This way of resolving the problem seems
to succumb to an animals and small-children-style objection, but a more fundamental problem for this line
of thought, we think, is the wrong content problem we raise at the end of Sect. 4. We thank an anonymous
referee at Synthese for raising this line of discussion.
3 Cf. Jeffrey (1990).
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well be secured by dispensing with credence in favor of other doxastic attitudes that
are more similar to belief by being representational.4
Moreover, we suggest that this alternative framework can still allocate a special
place to belief. Ultimately, we will characterize belief in terms of acceptance. Accep-
tance is themental state of taking some propositional content 〈p〉 for granted—whether
consciously or not—in practical reasoning and rational decision-making; acceptance
ordinarily causes acting as if 〈p〉 is true.5 Acceptance of 〈p〉 involves using 〈p〉 as
a working hypothesis. Acceptance of a propositional content is sometimes rational
and sometimes not, depending on the strength of one’s epistemic position and the
practical stakes. (As an important aside, we note that “epistemic position” is intended
throughout to be a neutral way of talking about something like the subject’s evi-
dential condition as determined by her total body of evidence without raising any
question about what evidence is. Thus, in particular, “epistemic position” is not a way
of referring to the subject’s doxastic states either taken collectively or individually.)
Our proposal will be that belief is the weakest doxastic attitude that normally suf-
fices for rational acceptance. So, it can make sense for a cognizer to traffic largely
in beliefs, considering whether to take up stronger or weaker doxastic attitudes only
when practical stakes are sufficiently high or low.6 Moreover, we will suggest that
whether to take up stronger or weaker doxastic attitudes can, in a wide range of cases,
be determined by what one believes. So, agents can regularly make decisions that are
rational across a wide range of circumstances on the basis of rationally held beliefs
alone.
Our project is significant because one of the deepest ideological divides within
epistemology concerns the relative importance of belief versus credence. The moral
of this paper is that one may have to look beyond decision-making and action to
settle that debate. For instance, it may be more productive to consider Harman’s
(1986) contention that understanding human reasoning requires a belief-based frame-
work rather than a credence-based one.7 Alternatively, one might consider whether or
not the basic doxastic elements should be representations in the sense highlighted in
Sect. 4.
Before continuing, however, it’s worth clarifying what isn’t at issue in this paper.
The credence-based framework is closely associated with probabilism, the view that,
insofar as a subject’s assignment of credence is rational, it behaves like an assignment
of probability. However, something verymuch like probabilism is also accepted among
some traditional epistemologists: it is sometimes accepted that beliefs can be more or
less rational, and moreover, that levels of rationality function like levels of likelihood,
which should be understood as a kind of probability.8 Clearly, then, it cannot be
a requirement that defenders of belief-based epistemology do without anything like
4 To be clear, wemean here ‘representational’ in the sense of definitively rendering the world in a particular
way rather than having propositional content so as to be about entities in the world.
5 The distinction between acceptance and acting as if is clearly drawn in Ross and Schroeder (2012). On
acceptance, see also Bratman (1992) and Weatherson (2005).
6 See Sect. 5 for more development of this element of the proposal.
7 See Broome (2013) and especially Staffel (2012) for some discussion.
8 See Smith (2010).
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epistemic probability. We will discuss this theoretical possibility in Sect. 6, but strictly
speaking, accepting it is not part of the belief-based picture. What’s primarily at issue
is not the viability of epistemic probability, but the extent to which epistemic statuses
of credence are more fundamental than epistemic statuses of belief.
§1
Both belief and credal states qualify as doxastic attitudes, broadly construed. But,
belief is an “on-or-off” attitude; believing a proposition stands in opposition to with-
holding belief with respect to that proposition. By contrast, credence comes in degrees;
arguably, each of a continuum of opposing credal states is possible in principle (even
if not in practice for limited human beings). Perhaps more importantly, the correctness
of beliefs—their accuracy—is an all or nothing affair. A belief is correct if it is true,
and incorrect if false. In contrast, to the extent that accuracy makes sense for credal
states, it is a matter of degree.9 In taking up belief towards a proposition, the aim is
to possess the truth (by believing it),10 yet all but the most extreme credal states do
not take a definitive position per se on what the truth of a given matter is. For any
proposition 〈p〉, credences seem to split the difference (with a particular weighting)
between opposing positions on whether 〈p〉. For instance, if one holds .3 credence
towards the proposition that it will rain today, one’s credal state is not incorrect in
any obvious sense if the proposition turns out to be false, i.e. it does not, in fact,
rain. However, there is no obvious reason why this would change if one’s credence is,
instead, .9 (unless .9 credence is taken to additionally constitute belief or some similar
“on-or-off” attitude)11 since there is no principled difference between .3 and .9, only
a difference of degree.
It is fairly obvious that there must be certain relationships between the respective
epistemologies of beliefs and credal states.12 For instance, it is clear that it can’t
simultaneously be rational to believe 〈p〉 while it is also rational to hold the minimum
credence in 〈p〉. Nevertheless, the relationship between these epistemologies is not
altogether clear. Echoing Weatherson (2005),13 we might ask:
9 See Joyce (1998). For further discussion of Bayesian attempts to locate what would play the role of
correctness conditions for credal states, see also Hajek (unpublished). Unlike van Fraassen (1983, 1984)
and Lange (1999) who appeal here to calibration, Hajek takes it that belief is to truth as credal states are to
agreement with objective chance.
10 For some discussion, see Dummett (1959), Wright (1992), Engel (1998), Velleman (2000), Wedgwood
(2002, 2007), Shah (2003), Shah and Velleman (2005), Gibbard (2005), Steglich-Peterson (2006), Lynch
(2009), Whiting (2010), and Jarvis (2012).
11 Moreover, it seems difficult to understand how credal states could straightforwardly constitute on-off
belief given that the latter seems to be incorrect when the propositional content is false while the former
does not.
12 Cf. Hajek and Eriksson (2007) for a survey of different positions on the nature of credal states. Cf.
Chalmers (2011) for a discussion of the nature of the objects of credal states.
13 In a parallel passage, Weatherson (2005), in fact, asks these questions about degrees of belief and belief
tout court rather than their respective epistemologies. Thanks to an anonymous referee for asking us to
clarify.
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Do we really have two subject matters here (epistemology of degrees of belief
and epistemology of belief tout court) or two descriptions of the one subject
matter? If just one subject matter, what relationship is there between the two
modes of description of this subject matter?
These questions concern the extent to which the epistemic statuses of belief settle
the epistemic statuses of credence—and vice-versa. The concern is whether the com-
plete account of the epistemic statuses of beliefs leaves a remainder for the complete
account of the epistemic statuses of credences—and vice-versa. There are, of course,
metaphysical and epistemic interpretations of settling and remainder—corresponding,
we think, to each of the two questions. The epistemic reading (the second question)
might be stated (roughly) in the terms of Chalmers (2012): to what extent are the
epistemic statuses of credence scrutable from those of belief—and vice-versa? The
metaphysical reading (the first question) would be: to what extent do the epistemic
statuses of credence metaphysically supervene on those of belief—and vice-versa?
(The orthodox position is that while scrutability entails metaphysical supervenience,
the converse may not be true, so these questions are genuinely distinct.)14
In addition, however, there is a further question about whether there is any explana-
tory order to the epistemic statuses of belief and credence, respectively. Could it be
that when it isn’t rational to believe 〈p〉, but rational to hold the minimum credence
in 〈p〉, that the former explains the latter? There are three available positions on the
fundamentality of belief-based versus credence-based epistemology:
Belief Fundamentalist Epistemology (bfe): The epistemic statuses of belief are
more fundamental.
Credence Fundamentalist Epistemology (cfe): The epistemic statuses of cre-
dence are more fundamental.
Anti-Fundamentalist Epistemology (afe): Neither kind of epistemic status is
more fundamental.
afe implies that, when it comes to the epistemic statuses of belief and credence,
there is no (asymmetrical) constitutive dependence of one on the other. Consider, for
instance, the status of (epistemic) rationality. The idea is that it is not the case that
a belief is rational because a certain kind of credal state is rational, nor is a credal
state rational because some kind of belief is rational. Matters of rationality for belief
and credence might be interrelated, but one does not participate in (metaphysically)
grounding the other. The degree of credence one is rationally committed to having in
some proposition 〈p〉 is not, for instance, constitutively a matter of how easy it would
be to come to have a rational belief with propositional content 〈p〉 even if the former
has consequences for the latter and vice-versa.15
14 For some relevant discussion, see not only Chalmers (2012), but Ichikawa & Jarvis (2013).
15 Cf. Harman (1986, p. 22) on degrees of belief: “I am inclined to suppose that these varying strengths
are implicit in a system of beliefs one accepts in a yes/no fashion. My guess is that they are to be explained
as a kind of epiphenomenon resulting from the operation of rules of revision. For example, it may be that
P is believed more strongly than Q if it would be harder to stop believing P than to stop believing Q….”
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bfe and cfe both deny afe. Consider first bfe. Strong bfe insists that the epis-
temic statuses of credence are wholly determined and constitutively explained by the
epistemic statuses of belief (so there is no remainder). A non-trivial example might
be the Williamsonian suggestion that rational credence is probability conditional on
(the certainty) of those beliefs that qualify as knowledge.16 However, bfe itself insists
only that the epistemic statuses of credence are at least partly grounded in those of
belief while admitting that there may be other factors as well. (Of course, this “partial
grounding” could not be reciprocal, but rather must be asymmetrical.)
Analogously, strong cfe insists that the epistemic statuses of belief are wholly
determined and constitutively explained by the epistemic statuses of credence (so,
again, there is no remainder). Consider this bi-conditional: a belief 〈p〉 is rational if
and only if credence in 〈p〉 above some given threshold is rational.17 If the left-hand
side is understood as the analysandum and the right-hand side is understood as the
analysans, then what we have is an example of strong cfe. However, as with bfe, cfe
need not be strong. A non-strong version of cfe might suggest that rational credence
above a given threshold is a necessary precondition for rational belief, but that other
factors unrelated to credence contribute to constituting the rationality of belief as well.
All three positions—bfe, cfe, and afe—have an air of plausibility to them. Wedg-
wood (2012) notes that a spectrum of positions have been taken on the relationship
between belief and credence.18 Presumably, the spectrum looks very similar when
it comes to the relationship between the epistemologies of belief and credence. Our
interest in this paper is this relationship between the epistemologies (which isn’t nec-
essarily settled by the relationship between the psychologies of belief and credence).
Nevertheless, we want to be very clear that our intention in this paper is not to rule out
any of bfe, cfe, and afe. Rather, we wish to show that a certain prominent consid-
eration in favor of cfe—the one we will explore in the next section—can be resisted.
This will open the door to epistemological frameworks that emphasize the importance
of doxastic representations, i.e. bfe and afe. But, it is well beyond the scope of this
paper to give a positive argument for any such framework.
§2
As was noted in the introduction, cfe appears to gain support from cases such as car
insurance. Because in that case it is rational for you to believe that your car will not
be stolen during the next five years, it will ordinarily be rational for you to believe
that you will be financially worse off by accepting the offer to purchase insurance.
Stipulate that car insurance is an ordinary case. Stipulate also that you will gain no
emotional comfort from having the insurance. A theft of the car would be bad, but it
would not spell financial demise for you. Indeed, as far as this decision is concerned,
16 Williamson (1998, 2002).
17 This thesis is analogous to the Lockean theory of belief whereby believing is having credence above a
certain threshold. For some relevant discussion here, see Christensen (2004), Sturgeon (2008), Foley (2009),
and Fantl and McGrath (2009, Chap. 5).
18 Wedgwood (2012, p. 310).
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the only considerations that are relevant for you are financial. Still, it could easily be
rational for you to accept the offer to purchase this car insurance.
A credence-based epistemology can easily accommodate this result. It may be
rational for you to believe that you will be financially worse off by accepting the
offer. But, that need not imply that it would be rational to hold the maximum credence
in this proposition. Indeed, if the former does imply the latter, then there may be
bigger problems. It becomes more difficult to envision how rational belief is even
possible—so skepticism threatens. Or if the former does not imply the latter, the
relationship between rational action and credence becomes more obscure.19 If fairly
ordinary beliefs are rational and rational belief entails rational maximum credence,
then it could not plausibly be that rational maximum credence rationalizes staking
one’s life on the truth of the belief (because the rationality of ordinary beliefs certainly
doesn’t). In other words, we’ve moved quite far from even the spirit of Ramsey’s
suggestion that credences are closely associated with betting patterns.20 Putting aside
the theoretical option of an entailment between rational belief and rational maximum
credence, it is plausible that although it is rational for you to believe that you would
be financially worse off, it also could easily be rational to hold some non-minimal
credence in the proposition that you would be financially better off by accepting the
offer.21 And, this non-minimal credence could be above the threshold required tomake
it rational to accept the offer to purchase the car theft insurance for ten dollars.22
Without the resources of a credence-based epistemology, it becomes more difficult
to understand the rationality of accepting the offer. Ex hypothesi, what you believe is
that you would be financially worse off by taking the offer, and no other non-financial
considerations are relevant. So, how could it be rational to accept the offer?
The question is not merely how it could be rational for you to do what is, by your
own beliefs, worse. Perhaps beliefs are simply not the kind of cognitive state to rely
on in this situation. Using the terminology from the introduction, we might say, pace
Fantl and McGrath (2009) and others, that the rationality of belief need not imply the
rationality of acceptance.23 Perhaps this is counterintuitive, but we can bite that bullet.
Even so, a problem remains. How could it be rational for you to do what is, by your
own beliefs, worse unless it is rational for you to have some further doxastic state
that puts you in a position to appreciate that this action would be, in fact, rational?
19 See Kaplan’s (2009) discussion of Williamson (2002) for some helpful discussion here.
20 See Ramsey (1931), Skyrms (1980), and Christensen (2004, Chap. 5) for some discussion about the rela-
tionship between betting patterns and credence. For some discussion of how betting patterns and credence
come apart, see Bradley and Leitgeb (2006). Relatedly, note that even though many deny a metaphysical
connection between credences and betting patterns, it is much harder to deny a normative connection. See
Christensen (2004). Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging this latter point.
21 It is noteworthy that Wedgwood (2012) responds to the dilemma introduced in this paragraph by
postulating two kinds of credence: rational belief entails rational maximum practical credence, but not
rational maximum theoretical credence.
22 Dutch-book arguments are used to show that making decisions in this kind of way makes it rational
for credence to function as a kind of subjective probability—for discussion see, for example, Christensen
(2004, Chap. 5) and Hajek (2008). But, as we pointed out in the introduction, probabilism is not really at
issue in this paper.
23 See also Engel (1998).
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Presumably, it couldn’t. So what are these further doxastic states that put you in a
position to appreciate that this action would be, in fact, rational? Call this “the Further
Doxastic State Question.”
One option for circumventing the Further Doxastic State Question is to deny that
the description of car insurance leaves much room for it to be rational to accept the
offer. The description stipulates that it is rational for you believe that your car will not
be stolen during the next five years. But then, onemight say, it could not but be rational
for you to reject the offer to insure for car theft given that financial considerations are
all that matters. So, if it is ordinarily rational to accept this kind of offer (i.e. not in
car insurance, but in less unusual cases with a similar description), then it is only
because, in these same ordinary circumstances, it is not rational to believe that your car
will not be stolen during the next five years. This might be because, as a general rule,
it is very difficult to be in a strong enough epistemic position to rationally have this
belief. But then we’re trending towards skepticism again—an unpalatable result.24
Alternatively, an option would be to say the following: that even though it wouldn’t
ordinarily be difficult to be in a strong enough epistemic position rationally to have
this belief, being in a “practical environment”25 where this offer is available makes it
difficult. The latter approach involves thinking that rationality for belief is subject to
pragmatic encroachment: pragmatic factors about what courses of action play a role
in determining the rationality of belief.26
However, pragmatic encroachment creates problems for the rational governance of
belief.27 Rational governance of belief implies the agent believes, by and large, because
it is rational to believe. Pragmatic encroachment implies that whether it is rational to
believe depends on strength of epistemic position and the relevant pragmatic factors.
So to believe, by and large, when it is rational and not, by and large, otherwise, one
will have to be able to track (fallibly) the strength of one’s epistemic position and
the relevant pragmatic factors. How does one track (even fallibly) the strength of
one’s epistemic position and the relevant pragmatic factors? Call this “the Tracking
Question.”
Again, credence-based epistemology provides a straightforward answer. One can
track strength of one’s epistemic position with regard to any proposition 〈p〉 with
more fine-grained credal states. And, one can track pragmatic factors using one’s
credal states and preferences. The relative practical merits of acceptance versus non-
acceptance of a proposition 〈p〉 can be measured by something like their relative
expected values (as determined by credences and preferences). If belief rationally
requires acceptance, then we can measure the practical merits of belief versus non-
belief in the same kind of way.28
24 For some interesting and relevant discussion on this point, see Greco (2012).
25 Hawthorne (2004).
26 What we’ve rehearsed here is, more or less, Fantl and McGrath’s (2009) argument from fallibilism to
pragmatic encroachment. On pragmatic encroachment, see also Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005), Ganson
(2008), Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), and Grimm (2011).
27 See Ichikawa et al. (2012). Wedgwood (2012, §6) addresses a similar issue.
28 Cf. Weatherson (2005) and Ross and Schroeder (2012).
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The emerging picture is onewhere, in oneway or another, credence looks to bemore
theoretically interesting than belief. First consider the purely intellectualist approach
where pragmatic factors don’t matter for epistemic evaluation. On this approach, we
run into the Further Doxastic State Question (so long, at least, as we steer clear of
skepticism).We could easily answer this question by pointing to credence as the further
doxastic state, but only by acknowledging a more fundamental relationship between
rational credence and rational action than there is between rational belief and rational
action. This may well obviate the need for belief in the cognitive system—at least in
principle. At least as far as rational action is concerned, belief would turn out to be
essential only if it is simply constituted by credence in some sort of way, e.g. belief
is a matter of having credence above a certain threshold. When it comes to rational
action, only a modest role for belief is apparently available, if any. In practice, it may
be useful to have beliefs, because dealing with credence is cognitively taxing and
we are rationally limited.29 But, ideally, it would be better to make decisions using
credences. And, one has to move from belief-based practical reasoning to credence-
based practical reasoning whenever one perceives sufficient risk.
On a pragmatic encroachment approach, we run into the TrackingQuestion (so long
as we continue to steer clear of skepticism). We could easily answer this question by
pointing to credence as the tracker, but then one is rationally governing one’s believing
by having credal states. But why bother to manage one’s beliefs by having credal
states?30 Why not just manage one’s actions directly instead? Again, credence seems
to obviate the need for belief in the cognitive system in principle (unless credence
simply constitutes belief); and, it may obviate the need for belief in practice as well.
On both approaches, rational credence gives us a way of answering a pressing ques-
tion. But, if rational credence is the way that we must answer these pressing questions,
then bfe looks dubious. If we have to turn to rational credence to solve problems that
arise from casting our epistemology solely in terms of belief, then it just looks like a
credence-based epistemology has more resources than a belief-based epistemology in
the sense that a belief-based epistemology simply cannot account for the same range of
phenomena—in particular, either rational action (if we keep the relationship between
rational belief and rational action loose)31 or rational belief governance (if we keep
it tight).32 This would be a good reason (even if not an especially conclusive rea-
son) to think that bfe is false. Moreover, cfe (but not necessarily strong cfe!) would
be hard to avoid unless there is some other range of phenomena that a belief-based
epistemology can account for but a credence-based epistemology cannot. (Remem-
ber: cfe merely entails the explanatory priority of credence-based epistemology; only
strong cfe entails that credence-based epistemology settles belief-based epistemology
without remainder.)
Of course, it is not our contention that either the Further Doxastic State Question
or the Tracking Question have to be answered by pointing to credence; our aim is
29 Hill and Schechter (2007).
30 Cf. Christensen’s (2004) discussion in §4.4 of Kaplan’s (1996) theory of belief.
31 Cf. Hill and Schechter (2007) and Reed (2010).
32 See references in footnote 28.
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to pursue a way for resisting this idea. Because we are particularly concerned by the
Tracking Question,33 we prefer to take an intellectualist approach (rather than opt for
pragmatic encroachment). So, our interest here will be in resisting cfe by finding an
answer to the Further Doxastic State Question. It is not our intention, however, to take
a stand here about other ways that an advocate for the theoretical prominence of belief
might respond to this dilemma. For all we say, there may be other promising avenues
to pursue.
By way of reminder, the Further Doxastic State Question is “What are those further
doxastic states that put you in a position to appreciate that some possible action would
be, in fact, rational in cases like car insurance in which, by your own beliefs, this
action is worse?” One possible answer to this question is these further doxastic states
are, in fact, beliefs.34 So, while by your own beliefs, this action is worse, still by some
other route, your beliefs let you appreciate that this action would be, in fact, rational.
If it could be made to work, this kind of answer would definitely help the advocate of
bfe.
This is not the route that we intend to pursue most immediately. In Sect. 7, we
do propose that, in practice, rational action may be possible, by and large, for an
agent trafficking only in beliefs precisely because an agent’s whole network of beliefs
may register a lot about how secure any particular belief is in light of the agent’s
experiences. Nevertheless, we think that a straightforward “further beliefs” answer
to the Further Doxastic State Question confronts a sort of wrong content problem.
In car insurance, for instance, the relevant question seems to be whether your car
will be stolen in the near future—something you believe to be false. Presumably, you
have beliefs that are inferentially connected to this belief, e.g. that you live in a safe
neighborhood. You may also have beliefs about how strong or weak your epistemic
position is with respect to the proposition that your car will be stolen, e.g. the epistemic
probability of theft. But, whether you will receive a benefit or encounter a loss from
the course of action in question—purchasing insurance—doesn’t precisely turn on the
truth or falsehood of most of these further beliefs. It turns precisely on whether or
not your car will be stolen. (Assuming there is no emotional security gained from the
purchase, purchasing insurance will benefit you if your car is stolen and otherwise
be a loss.) So, many of these further beliefs aren’t directly related enough to the
potential reason-giving facts for or against purchasing insurance. We conclude that
many of these further beliefs cannot ultimately be the rationalizers for action in this
case; they have the wrong content to do so. (Of course, the belief that your car will
not be stolen has the right content, but the rational belief isn’t “strong enough” to
rationalize forgoing insurance; in this instance, the problem appears to be not with the
content, but the attitude.) In particular, beliefs about one’s epistemic position have the
wrong content because although one’s epistemic position is relevant to whether one
acts rationally, the aim of acting is not to act rationally per se, but to act to secure
benefits, diminish losses, right wrongs, uphold justice, etc.—that is to say, to make
appropriate changes in the world. Beliefs with the right content to rationalize action
33 See Ichikawa et al. (2012).
34 See, for example, Ichikawa (2012).
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are precisely those directed outwardly at the sources of benefit, loss, right, and wrong
in the world, not directed in a self-fascinated way at factors relevant to the subject’s
own rationality or evidence. To rationalize action, the beliefs must be rational and
supported by evidence, not be about rationality or evidential support.
In addition, we suspect that while one’s network of beliefs may register a lot about
how secure any particular belief is in light of the agent’s experiences, it doesn’t register
everything. Accounting for maximally rational action really does cause problems for
a strong version of bfe that insists that the epistemic statuses of credence are wholly
determined and constitutively explained by those of belief precisely because even an
entire network of beliefs won’t generally reflect all aspects of one’s evidence that
are relevant to selecting a course of action that is maximally rational. To adequately
account for how one might, in principle, act maximally rationally in all possible cases,
one needs to move away from a purely belief-based epistemology to an epistemology
of a more general kind. This will be our course.
§3
Let’s begin looking for an answer to the Further Doxastic State Question by thinking
carefully about why a credence-based epistemology seems to handle car insurance
with such ease. Why doesn’t the Further Doxastic State Question seem to arise for
credences like it does for beliefs? For instance, why aren’t there obvious cases in
which questions about whether it is rational to have some credence are settled, but
these answers conflict with answers to questions aboutwhich potential course of action
is rational? We contend that the difference here is the fact that there is a continuum
of credal states, whereas with belief, it seems like there’s only belief and withholding
belief.
It is not hard to imagine variants of car insurance in which your epistemic
position vis-à-vis the proposition that your car will not be stolen is much stronger.
For instance, you might know that the area that you live and work in is renowned
for its exceedingly low crime rate and very effective law enforcement. And, we can
imagine variants in which your epistemic position is much weaker, e.g. in contrast to
the original case, you might know that car theft is prevalent in your area, particularly
theft of the brand of car you drive. But, these differences in epistemic strength can’t
be captured by a (first-order)35 doxastic attitude towards the proposition if the only
attitudes to choose from are believing and withholding. There are two attitudes, but
at least three different epistemic positions. So, one attitude will have to double as
the response to two different epistemic positions. Information about which of the two
epistemic positions you are in will not be registered by this attitude. Merely adding
another doxastic attitude won’t help. Consider any two variants of our original case,
car insurancex and car insurancey that are strictly ordered by epistemic position
with respect to the proposition in question. Mightn’t we always find some third case,
35 Wecontrast first-order doxastic attitudeswith second-order doxastic attitudes that are about differences in
epistemic strength.While differences in second-order doxastic attitudes can register differences in epistemic
strength, a theory that relies heavily on them suffers from the wrong content problem discussed previously.
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car insurancez, that falls strictly between them in this regard? If so, this shows that
the set of doxastic attitudes must be (at least) a dense topological space akin to the set
of rational numbers in order to register all these different possible epistemic positions.
The reason that registering epistemic positions matters for rational action is that
many differences in epistemic position with respect to some relevant proposition 〈p〉
can make for corresponding differences in whether a particular action is (maximally)
rational. To better improve rationality with respect to action, it pays to be able to
register more differences in one’s epistemic position with respect to a proposition.
That way, no matter what the threshold for rational action turns out to be vis-à-vis
strength of epistemic position, one will be able to determine whether it is met. This
discussion suggests a remedy to the advocate of belief-based epistemology who wants
to answer the Further Doxastic State Question. Just introduce further doxastic attitudes
to go alongside belief—one for every possible epistemic position one could have with
respect to a proposition.
§4
A cfe advocate might complain that this strategy concedes too much. Isn’t acknowl-
edging an infinite number of possible doxastic attitudes towards a proposition just
letting credences in through the back door? Here, it is important to pay close attention
to which aspects of credence-based epistemology do and which don’t help with the
determinations of rational action. What helps is the large number of credal states. But
there are other features that don’t seem to matter.
Consider a disparity between belief and credence noted earlier: the correctness
of beliefs—their accuracy—is an all or nothing affair; in contrast, to the extent that
accuracy makes sense for credal states, it is a matter of degree. This disparity seems
to account for the fact that although both beliefs and credal states have propositional
content—and are, in some sense, about the world—only beliefs are a genuine kind of
mental representation, i.e. mental states that definitively render the world as being a
particular way.
This feature of credences played no role in our discussion last section. The expla-
nation given there was that because the number of credal states is infinite, an infinite
number of different epistemic positions can be registered with respect to some propo-
sition. And, this turns out to be significant since any difference of epistemic position
could be a relevant difference for rational action; having credences puts one in a posi-
tion to select the rational action across these differences in epistemic position. Nothing
in this reasoning turns on whether credences are a genuine kind of mental representa-
tion or not. The existence of an injective mapping from epistemic positions to credal
states is all that matters.
Here is another feature of credence that doesn’t seem to matter: each credal state
rationally precludes other credal states.36 Holding a higher degree of credence in
36 Suppose that, instead of working with credal states as they are traditionally understood, we work with
at-least and no-greater-than credal states. Obviously, any given at-least or no-greater-than credal state will
be rationally compatible with—i.e. not rationally precluded by—any number of other at-least or no-greater-
than credal states. Nevertheless, it should be evident that working in a framework in which these sorts of
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a proposition rationally precludes holding a lower. This is not to say that it would
be irrational to hold a kind of mushy credence37 that is indeterminate between the
two. It is merely to say that given that one has committed oneself by holding a more
determinate credal state, one is rationally precluded from simultaneously holding some
distinct determinate credal state.
If the two features just discussed don’t matter when it comes to explaining why
credences appear to do better than belief vis-à-vis rational action, then we should
be able to omit them without losing the virtues of the credence framework vis-à-vis
rational action. In other words, the door is open to the following view: there is a
hierarchy of basic doxastic attitudes with a very large cardinality.38 For each of these
doxastic attitudes, D, there is also a corresponding basic attitude of withholding D.
Belief is among this hierarchy. But, there are stronger attitudes like being-sure or
being-absolutely-certain. They are stronger in the sense that the rationality of belief
doesn’t entail but is compatible with the rationality of taking these attitudes. And,
there are weaker attitudes like (at least) suspecting. They are weaker in the sense that
the rationality of taking up these attitudes doesn’t entail but is compatible with the
rationality of belief.
Moreover, all of these attitudes are genuine mental representations that are entirely
beholden to the world for their correctness (simpliciter), depending only on whether
they are true. Indeed, in taking up any of these doxastic attitudes, the aim is to possess
the truth by having that attitude. As an anonymous referee astutely noted, this latter
“representational” difference seems to bring the first difference of rational compatibil-
ity of stronger andweaker doxastic attitudeswith it.Oneway to appreciate this is to note
that, were credences genuine representations, they would be very bizarre ones—since
a .65 credence towards the proposition that it will rain today would, while increasingly
likely to be accurate as one’s epistemic position strengthened, would simultaneously
become increasingly less rational. To fix this problem, genuine representations must
not rationally preclude strictly stronger doxastic attitudes.
One might wonder how all these distinct doxastic attitudes could have the same aim
of possessing the truth. Isn’t belief individuated from other attitudes by having this
aim?39 Actually, no. In other work, we suggest that having the aim of possessing the
truth is equivalent to being committed to implement good methods for possessing the
truth on the basis of one’s experiences.40 This characterization doesn’t say how good
themethodsmust be; using better orworsemethods corresponds to aimingmore or less
stringently at possessing the truth. Our proposal now is that every way of specifying
how good the methods must be corresponds to a distinct doxastic attitude. When it
Footnote 36 continued
credal states are taken as fundamental puts one at no disadvantage relative to the more traditional framework
when it comes to accounting for how an agent might, in principle, select a rational course of action.
37 On mushy credences, see Elga (2010), White (2009), and Joyce (2010).
38 Cf. Turri’s (2010) suggestion that there is a hierarchy of speech acts. This is also similar toWilliamson’s
(2002) countable hierarchy built on the suggestion that believing 〈I know 〈p〉〉 is taking a stronger position
believing 〈p〉. Our proposal is more radical and does not rely on giving up the KK principle.
39 See references in footnote 10.
40 See Jarvis and Katherine (2015).
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comes to believing, one is committed to using methods that are fairly effective at
landing true representations rather than false representations. However, in considering
whether to take up or retain the stronger attitude of being sure that, one is committed
to using methods that are strictly better in this regard.
At this point, it may be helpful to consider the familiar Jamesian point that the aim of
possessing the truth is best understood as a mixture of two competing aims: truly rep-
resenting and not misrepresenting.41 This dual-characterization has been espoused in
different ways42 by Descartes (xx),43 Alston (1985),44 Foley (1987),45 David (2001),
Fallis (2006)46 and many others. Importantly, truly representing and not misrepresent-
ing are competing aims because one can only fulfill the first aim by putting oneself
at risk of not fulfilling the second. Weighting the second aim more would lead one to
be more cautious in order to avoid possible misrepresentation. Weighting the first aim
more would lead one to be bolder in order to possess more truths.
Our proposal develops this Jamesian thought in a novel direction: different ways
of mixing these two aims correspond to doxastic attitudes at different places in the
hierarchy.47 There are attitudes like being-sure, where the second aim is appropriately
weighted more (so that misrepresentation is worse and failing to truly represent isn’t
so bad), and there are attitudes like suspecting, where the first aim is appropriately
weighted more (so that failing to truly represent is worse and misrepresentation isn’t
so bad). But, the aim of all of these doxastic attitudes is to possess the truth by having
the attitude. It’s just the mixture of the twin aims—how important they should be in
different situations—that varies.
We end this section by noting that “different ways of mixing” these two aims
may but need not be construed as assigning each aim a scalar corresponding to its
relative importance. (This scalar mixing approach appears to line up each distinct
doxastic representation in the hierarchy with, what is in effect, some kind of minimal
credal threshold.) Another way to mix the aims is to decide which sorts of error
possibilities are tolerable in order take a chance on possessing the truth. For instance,
misrepresenting because one is deceived by an evil Cartesian demonmight be tolerable
for belief, but not for absolute certainty. By tolerating all error possibilities, one is
giving all the weight to truly representing. By tolerating no error possibilities, one
is giving all the weight to not misrepresenting. But, of course, there are many ways
41 James (1897).
42 See David (2001), especially §1, for a nice survey of several of these positions.
43 In Meditation IV, Descartes describes his aim as to arrive at the truth whilst taking precautions to “avoid
ever going wrong.”
44 Alston goes so far as to identify the dual-aims as constitutive of epistemic evaluation itself (Alston
1985, pp. 83–84).
45 Foley puts the point in terms of epistemic rationality, which, for him, involves the goal of “now believing
those propositions that are true and now not believing those propositions that are false” (Foley 1987, p. 8).
46 As Fallis (2006, p. 180) puts it, “The two epistemic values most often discussed by epistemologists are
having true beliefs and avoiding error.”
47 Cf. Carter et al. (2015). Note also this seems contrary to the way in which James originally developed
this point. It appears to undermine Kelly’s (2013) Jamesian argument against uniqueness as defended by
White (2005).*****
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of tolerating some error possibilities, but not others. Each of these corresponds to a
different way of mixing the aims of truly representing and not misrepresenting.48
Our proposal in Sect. 6 develops this picture in more detail. In Sect. 6, we suggest
that each doxastic attitude in the hierarchy might be characterized by a division of the
space of possibilities into those that aremore or less abnormal. To afirst approximation,
abnormality is the same as tolerability in the sense that abnormal error possibilities
are usually tolerable. More exactly, possibilities are more abnormal for a doxastic
attitude, D, to the extent that one has to have special evidence that they obtain before
they become intolerable error possibilities for D. On the view in question, an agent
rationally holds doxastic attitude, D, towards 〈p〉 if and only if 〈p〉 is true in, what
are for D, the least abnormal possibilities that are strictly compatible with the agent’s
experiences.
§5
The picture we have developed thus far may not satiate those who contend that belief
is theoretically significant. What we have is an alternative to credence-based episte-
mology, but it is representation-based rather than belief-based, per se.
In order to show that we have not abandoned belief, we must demonstrate how
belief occupies a special place in the hierarchy of doxastic attitudes. Our suggestion is
(roughly) that belief is the weakest doxastic attitude such that rationally holding that
attitude towards a proposition normally suffices for rational acceptance of that propo-
sition.49 (Recall: acceptance is the mental state of taking some propositional content
〈p〉 for granted—whether consciously or not—in practical reasoning and rational
decision-making; acceptance causes acting as if 〈p〉 is true.) Belief’s being the ‘weak-
48 It is appropriate to consider a connection between the proposal being advanced here, and a particular
kind of case that has been discussed in recent work by Reed (2010, p. 230), where a subject faces two
different sets of practical stakes relative to the same proposition. Reed’s case holds fixed a question you are
asked—a question about Roman History, where the answer (of which you are confident) is that Caesar was
born in 100BC—with two different practical stakes relative to this proposition which must be considered.
He writes:
‘…[T]here are two punishment/reward scenarios. The first is as before: for a correct answer, you receive
a jelly bean, and for an incorrect response, you get a very painful electric shock. In the second, a correct
answer results in a $1000 reward, while an incorrect one leads only to a very mild slap on the wrist. In both
scenarios, there is neither reward nor punishment for failing to answer. Although you must consider both
scenarios simultaneously, you are not bound to give the same answer in each’ (Reed 2010, p. 230).
While the context of Reed’s presentation of the case is that of raising an objection to subject sensitive
invariantism (pp. 228–230), it’s helpful to note how the view we are proposing can offers a very natural
way to think about such a case. With respect to the first punishment/reward scenario, it is not rational to
answer on the basis of belief; with respect to the second, it is rational to answer on the basis of either belief
or perhaps also the weaker attitude of suspecting-that. Thanks to an anonymous referee at Synthese for
drawing our attention to such cases.
49 A contrast may be helpful here. Consider Bratman (1987, p. 40): “To believe something is not merely
to assign a high probability to its occurrence. I might assign a high probability to my failing to move the log
without believing that I will fail … what seems distinctive about believing that I will fail is that it puts me
in a position to plan on the assumption of failure.” On our view, fairly strong epistemic positions—of the
sort Bratman seems to be alluding to by introducing ‘high probability’—do (at least typically) countenance
belief, so the relationship between believing and planning is much weaker, holding only ordinarily.
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est’ doxastic attitude with feature F means that there is no other doxastic attitude,
D, with feature F such that rationally believing entails rationally holding D, but not
vice-versa. ‘Normally suffices’ means that special circumstances—and in particular,
risky payoff structures—have to become apparent in order to break the link between
rational belief and rational acceptance. Risky payoff structures may be apparent if,
for example, the subject has reason to believe or even suspect that standing causal
regularities allow for significant changes in utility that would be attributable to having
taken one course of action rather than another.50 (Notice that credence is not obviously
necessary for tracking risky payoff structures.) When the link between rational belief
and rational acceptance is broken, it must be possible in principle for the subject to
explain the link away by citing the special circumstances in question. But, no explana-
tion is owed for why the link holds in canonical cases. ‘Normally suffices’ is plausibly
vague; it is not clear which are the normal possibilities in which the link to rational
acceptance has to hold for a doxastic attitude to count as belief. But, we think that
this fuzziness corresponds to a genuine indeterminacy in which among the doxastic
attitudes in the hierarchy is belief.
Our theory of belief allows us to make belief the starting point of rational decision-
making. When one is deliberating about what to do, it makes sense to start by
considering whether one’s beliefs support the conclusion that one of the possible
actions—say ψ-ing—would be best.51 If so, ψ-ing is ordinarily rational. If not, it may
not be immediately clear what to do. One may have to consider what other doxas-
tic attitudes one has as well as the potential costs and benefits of both correctly and
erroneously acting as if some particular action would be best.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve further into themechanics of (bounded or
unbounded) rational decision-making.52 It suffices for our purposes to emphasize that
the hierarchy of doxastic attitudes introduced previously is compatible with putting
belief at the center of the rational decision-making process. The suggestion is that our
first resort when considering what to do is simply to consider whether there is any
possible action that we believe to be best vis-à-vis our ends. In other words, belief has
the first word on what means to our ends we should take, even if it doesn’t have the
last. That is a significant enough role for belief to have in determining action.
§6
At the end of Sect. 3, we suggested that a representation-based epistemology can
imitate credence-based epistemology in a respect that’s important for accounting for
rational action.53 Let us pause to defend this suggestion briefly. Just as there are many
50 By ‘apparent’ we mean something like: ‘psychologically salient’.
51 This is, in effect, Lin’s (2013) Cliché Rule.
52 Notably, Lin (2013) gives a qualitative, belief-based decision theory that is straightforwardly general-
izable to other doxastic attitudes that are representational like belief. One might try adding a procedure for
determining which of these doxastic attitudes to use to make the decision.
53 In effect, we have turned the tables on credence sympathizers such as Joyce (1998) andMoss (2013) who
attempt to show that features of traditional epistemology—accuracy and Gettierization, respectively—can
be incorporated into a credence framework.
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credal states, so there can be many doxastic representational states. Moreover, just
as credal states are assigned real numbers from the unit interval, so we could assign
doxastic representational states real numbers from the unit interval in accordance with
their strength. As a consequence, there would be enough doxastic representational
states to register all the epistemic positions registered by credences. And, in principle,
that should allow for equally fine-grained determinations of action by both. This should
be obvious; in principle, one could assign credence level r (where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1)
to a proposition 〈p〉 if and only if level rcorresponds with the strongest doxastic
representational state it would be rational to hold towards 〈p〉, and calculate expected
utilities in the usual way.
Imitation is an available theoretical option that puts representation-based episte-
mology on a par with credence-based epistemology. However, in the remainder of this
section, we consider a potential reason not to favor imitation and consider what an
alternative to imitation might look like.
Consider san diego.
san diego: John and Jane are wondering whether there are any mules in the San
Diego Wild Animal Park that are cleverly disguised as zebras. John knows that
students from UC Sunnydale and Caltech had planned to put a mule cleverly
disguised as a zebra in the Park, but that the Caltech students cancelled their
plans to participate. John doesn’t know anything about how difficult this prank
would be to pull off. Jane has heard a rumor that somebody might be interested
in the prank, but doesn’t know who is interested or what their plans might be.
Jane works for the San Diego Wild Animal Park and knows about the security
at the Park. She knows it would be very difficult for UC Sunnydale students to
get past the security, but, because of differences in the engineering curriculum,
the Caltech students could figure out how.
How should we compare the strength of the epistemic positions that John and Jane
occupy with regard to the proposition 〈There is no mule in the San Diego Wild Animal
Park that is cleverly disguised as a zebra〉? John is in a better position to rule out
possibilities in which cleverly disguised mules are placed in the Park by Caltech
students, but Jane is in a better position to rule out possibilities in which cleverly
disguised mules are placed in the Park by UC Sunnydale students. Which matters
more? It is a theoretical possibility that this question doesn’t have an answer.
We can put this point more abstractly. In the story, John’s experiential condition
is strictly incompatible with some of the possibilities in which the proposition high-
lighted last paragraph is false.54 Many of these are possibilities that are not strictly
incompatible with Jane’s experiential condition. Let the set of these possibilities be S.
Jane’s experiential condition is also strictly incompatible with some of the possibilities
in which this proposition is false. Many of these are possibilities that are not strictly
incompatiblewith John’s experiential condition. Let the set of those possibilities be S∗.
Whether John’s or Jane’s epistemic position is stronger rests at least partly on whether,
by having experiences strictly incompatible with S and S∗ respectively, John’s experi-
54 “Strictly incompatible” in roughly the sense of Lewis (1996, p. 553).
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ential condition is strictly incompatible with “more” or “less” possibilities than Jane’s
is. But, the cardinality of these two sets may be the same. And, neither is a subset of
the other. Maybe the possibilities of one of these sets are, in some suitable epistemic
sense, collectively more probable than the possibilities of the other are. However, it
strikes us that comparisons of epistemic probability of this sort need not make sense.
After all, it is hardly clear that 〈There is no mule in the San Diego Wild Animal Park
that is cleverly disguised as a zebra〉 should have a definitive epistemic probability
for anyone. As a result, the epistemic positions of John and Jane may be incommensu-
rable. John’s epistemic positionmay be better in one respect. Jane’s epistemic position
may be better in another. But, there may be no fact of the matter about which is better
simpliciter.
In effect, we are considering the theoretical possibility that epistemic positions need
not have the structure of the real numbers between zero and one inclusive.55 Epistemic
positions may not be well-ordered or even total ordered by strength; the ordering may
only be partial. For any two epistemic positions x and y, it may be that neither is x
stronger than y, nor is y stronger than x , nor are they equal in strength. (The suggestion
is that some epistemic positions might be incommensurable, not that all are.) If so,
then degrees of beliefs—credences—are exactly the wrong kind of doxastic attitude
to register epistemic positions because degrees of beliefs are well-ordered.56 Persons
in epistemic positions of incommensurable strength with respect to some proposition
would have to assign less, more, or the same credence than one another even though
their respective epistemic positions are neither stronger, weaker, nor exactly the same.
One might wonder how there could be epistemic positions of incommensurable
strength. Couldn’t we discover the exact strength of an epistemic position for some
proposition 〈p〉 by seeing what kinds of odds a rational agent in that epistemic posi-
tion would need to bet on the truth of 〈p〉—ignoring, of course, practical or moral
considerations that might distort betting patterns? However, the theoretical possibil-
ity under consideration is precisely one in which the epistemic position itself does
not warrant any particular betting pattern. Of course, if offered a series of bets with
improving odds, a rational agent will be forced into adopting a betting pattern of some
sort. However, in the theoretical possibility under consideration, the choice of betting
pattern will not be adequately constrained by the agent’s epistemic position. She will
be forced into a betting pattern that is, to some degree, arbitrary at least as far as her
epistemic position with respect to 〈p〉 is concerned.
Moreover, we think that the betting pattern of this rational agent need not be directly
revelatory of her total doxastic state either. By way of analogy, consider Buridan’s ass.
Even if the ass opts for the stack of hay on the left rather than right, this need not
indicate a preference on the part of the ass for the stack of hay on the left rather than
55 It is worth noting that even credence sympathizers worry that epistemic positions need not have the
structure of the unit interval. Cf. Stugeon (2008, p. 159). Consider also that Joyce’s (2010) plea for imprecise
credences seems to be based on the thought that, for any proposition 〈p〉, there are epistemic positions that
are ambiguous so that there is no determinate fact as to how they compare with epistemic positions in which
facts about statistical frequencies relevant to the truth of 〈p〉 are known.
56 Unless, of course, degrees of belief come in more than one dimension as they do in the Dempster–Shafer
theory. On this model, a proposition is assigned a degree of belief and a degree of ignorance. See Huber
(2012) and Pryor (unpublished).
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right. Ex hypothesi, the ass has no reason to prefer the stack of hay on the left, so,
arguably, no such preference is rational. Of course, the ass should implement some
plan or other in order to eat hay, but this plan might well be settled upon arbitrarily
rather than wholly on the basis of an ungrounded preference for left. Similarly, we
think, a particular betting pattern with respect to 〈p〉 need not reveal some doxastic
attitude of definitive strength towards 〈p〉, particularly if that doxastic attitude would
not be warranted by a current epistemic position that is not only fallible, but genuinely
equivocal (i.e. not of definitive strength)with respect to 〈p〉. Instead, the betting pattern
may reveal only a strategic coping plan of the agent—e.g. a pragmatic credal function
rather than one constituting a genuine opinion with regards to 〈p〉. The rational agent
may chose this strategic coping plan somewhat arbitrarily albeit partly by reference to
a total doxastic state that is also equivocal (i.e. not of definitive strength) with regards
to 〈p〉 so as to precisely mirror her equivocal epistemic position.
The hierarchy of doxastic representations introduced in Sect. 4 is well equipped to
handle the theoretical possibility under consideration. The hierarchy may but need not
be well-ordered; in fact, it may only be partial ordered. So, it might do better at reg-
istering sometimes equivocal and therefore only partially ordered epistemic positions
than the credal scale. Of course, a hierarchy of doxastic attitudes wouldn’t have to be
a hierarchy of doxastic representations in order not to be total ordered by strength.
Still, we can see that representation-based epistemologymay have some flexibility that
credence-based epistemology does not obviously have—at least insofar as credence
is construed as a kind of subjective probability.
How much this flexibility matters depends partly on whether we can find a case
where difference of epistemic position matters for whether an action is rational even
though this difference is between epistemic positions that are of incommensurable
strength. We won’t pursue further whether there are such cases. We think it may
be interesting enough that, in principle, a representation-based psychology might be
better equipped to register differences in the strength of epistemic positions than a
credence-based psychology is regardless of whether this makes any difference for
rational action.
If the hierarchy of doxastic attitudes isn’t a total ordering by strength, what kind
of structure might it have? As alluded at the end of Sect. 4, perhaps, the strength of
doxastic attitudes is ordered by what sorts of possibilities are “relevant” in consid-
ering whether to hold the attitude or, equivalently, by which sort of possibilities are
“irrelevant” so that error in them is tolerable.57 In considering whether to believe a
proposition—e.g. 〈There is a goldfinch in the garden〉—certain skeptical possibilities
in which the proposition is false—e.g. possibilities involving fake goldfinches—might
be irrelevant. They might be irrelevant in the sense that the strict compatibility of these
possibilities with one’s experiential condition need not count against belief. But, in
considering whether to be absolutely certain that the proposition is true, these same
possibilities might be relevant; they must be strictly incompatible with one’s experi-
ential condition in order for taking up this attitude of absolute certainty to be rational.
The idea would be that for every set of possibilities, there is a unique doxastic attitude
57 Cf. Austin (1946), Dretske (1970), Goldman (1976), and Pritchard (2010).
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for which this is the set of relevant possibilities. Suppose we have doxastic attitudes
D and D∗ with sets X and X∗ as their sets of relevant possibilities, respectively. Then,
D is stronger than D∗ if and only if X is a proper superset of X∗. If X is not a proper
superset of X∗, then it will turn out that D is not stronger than D∗. And, if X∗ is also
not a proper superset of X , then it will turn out that D∗ is not stronger than D. Then,
D and D∗ turn out to be incommensurate with respect to strength.
As attractive as this suggestion might be, it can’t be quite right. The problem is
that while certain possibilities might not be relevant now, they might become relevant
in more bizarre circumstances. Imagine that you know that there is a prankster in
neighborhood planting fake goldfinches in gardens. These bizarre circumstancesmight
make possibilities involving fake goldfinches relevant even if they weren’t relevant
before. It might be that it wouldn’t be rational to believe 〈There is a goldfinch in
the garden〉 unless one’s experiences are strictly incompatible with these possibilities.
This suggests that wemove to a framework instead where possibilities are more or less
abnormal, wheremore abnormal possibilities become relevant towhether to believe on
the condition that one discovers oneself to be in more bizarre circumstances. Stronger
doxastic attitudes will be ones for which “crazier” possibilities are taken to be more
normal, and thus more easily relevant to whether to hold those attitudes. Weaker
doxastic attitudes will be ones for which only slightly surprising possibilities are taken
to be more abnormal, and thus less easily relevant to whether to hold those attitudes.
In fact, the kind of framework that we have in mind is explored formally by those
interested in non-monotonic consequence relations.58 With classical monotonic con-
sequence, if 〈p〉 is a consequence of 〈q〉, then it is also a consequence of 〈q〉 and 〈r〉.
This is no longer valid for non-monotonic consequence relations. Non-monotonic
consequence relations are, of course, an attempt to formalize genuinely “amplia-
tive” reasoning where the conclusion may “go beyond” what is contained collectively
in the premises. Because conclusions “go beyond” the premises, one may have to
backtrack on the conclusion upon learning more even without giving up any of the
previous premises. For this reason, the same conclusions don’t necessarily follow from
strengthened premise sets. As it turns out, non-monotonic consequence relations can
be characterized or “represented” by truth-preservation in the set of “least abnormal”
possible worlds.59,60 (Good ampliative reasoning is reasoning to a conclusion that
58 For a solid introduction to non-monotonic logic, see Makinson (2005).
59 This result is reported by Huber (2012). But, it should be intuitive enough to those familiar with Lewis
(1973) semantics for counterfactuals. The counterfactual relation between antecedent and consequent is,
in effect, a non-monotonic consequence relation since Strengthening the Antecedent does not hold. And,
famously, whether this counterfactual relation holds depends onwhether the consequent is true in the nearest
(read: ‘least abnormal’) worlds in which the antecedent is true.
60 An anonymous referee wondered whether the incommensurable doxastic attitudes we proposed leads
to permissivism as discussed in White (2005). The characterization of rationality we give here, in fact,
entails anti-permissivism. For any (determinate) doxastic attitude, either it will be true in what are for it all
the least abnormal possible worlds compatible with the subject’s experiential condition or it won’t. Thus,
any two subjects that differ with respect to the rationality of a doxastic attitude must ipso facto differ in
their experiential conditions in a way that matters for rationality. So, in effect, they won’t “share the same
total evidence” with respect to the proposition in question. This proves where uniqueness fails, there is
not the same total body of evidence—i.e. the contrapositive of anti-permissivism. Notably, this proof does
not rely on a trivialization of anti-permissivism as the argument does not presuppose that all difference in
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can be false even when one’s premises are true; more abnormal possible worlds will
be—by definition—those where this happens.) Different non-monotonic consequence
relations can thus be characterized or “represented” by different orderings of possible
worlds in terms of normality. When you impose a normality ranking on possibilities,
you are, in effect, imposing a non-monotonic consequence relation.
Our (toy) suggestion, then, appears to amount to this: doxastic attitudes within
our hierarchy are individuated by non-monotonic consequence relations—or more
intuitively, by the differences in what counts as valid ampliative reasoning for that
attitude—that generate, at a particular time, the doxastic attitudes from (the same full
set of) premises offered up by a subject’s experiences. By way of concrete example,
reasoning (in the absence of any particular background information) from the starting
point of a perceptual experience as of something with a barn façade to 〈That thing
is a barn〉 may be valid non-monotonic reasoning for belief, but not for a much
stronger doxastic attitude. The idea is this difference may participate in individuating
belief from its stronger counterpart (in roughly the same way having a non-negative
predecessor helps to individuate the number one from zero). More generally, weaker
doxastic attitudes have very strong non-monotonic consequence relations—you can
get a lot more out (in terms of “deductive” strength of the conclusion) for what you
put in (in terms of the collective “deductive” strength of the premises). At the limit
would be an absurd doxastic attitude that it would be rational to take towards any
proposition. This corresponds to a limiting case of a “non-monotonic” consequence
relation that allows you to get everything on the conclusion side out of anything on the
premise side. (It is a limiting case because this “non-monotonic” consequence relation
is monotonic; monotonic consequence relations are a special case of “non-monotonic”
consequence relations on our understanding.) Stronger doxastic attitudes have very
weak non-monotonic consequence relations.At the limitwould be the doxastic attitude
of absolute certainty that it would only be rational to take towards propositions that
strictly follow from one’s experiential condition. This corresponds to another limiting
case of a “non-monotonic” consequence relation that allows you to only get out on
the conclusion side what you put in on the premise side. (Again, it is a limiting case
because this “non-monotonic” consequence relation is monotonic.)
Notice that non-monotonic consequence relations are not total ordered by strength.
Of course, some non-monotonic consequence relations are stronger than others, in
the sense that the consequences of the former (for any premise set) include the
consequences of the latter (for that same premise set) and more besides. So, the dox-
astic attitude individuated by a stronger non-monotonic consequence relation will be
(strictly) weaker than the doxastic attitude individuated by the weaker non-monotonic
consequence relation. But, in many cases, we don’t have “consequence inclusion” of
Footnote 60 continued
experiential condition leads to differences in same total evidence; as far as the argument is concerned, the
sets of least abnormal possible worlds compatible with two genuinely distinct experiential conditions might
be entirely the same in certain cases. (To put the point yet another way, the argument is, in fact, compatible
with the enrichment discussed in the next footnote, whereby some genuinely distinct evidential conditions
might support rationalizes every proposition to exactly the same extent; the argument merely relies on the
idea that where there are differences in rationality, this is clearly not the case.)
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this sort. So, correspondingly, wewill have two doxastic attitudes that are potentially61
incommensurable in strength.
Byway of illustration, consider again John and Jane from san diego. Ex hypothesi,
John’s experiential condition is strictly incompatible with possibilities of S; so, in
principle, he doesn’t need anything from a non-monotonic consequence relation to
rule them out. But, he would need something from a non-monotonic consequence
relation to rule out the possibilities of S∗; those aren’t strictly compatible with his
experiential condition. Jane is in the reverse position. For John, whether it is rational
for him to take up a doxastic attitude, D, towards 〈There is a mule in the San Diego
Wild Animal Park that is cleverly disguised as a zebra〉 depends on whether the non-
monotonic consequence relation individuating D lets him rule out the possibilities of
S∗ given his experiential condition. For Jane it depends on whether the non-monotonic
consequence relation individuating D lets her rule out the possibilities of S given her
experiential condition. Suppose that the latter is true, but the former isn’t. In such
a case, Jane is rational in taking up D, but John isn’t. Still, there should be some
other non-monotonic consequence relation that lets John rule out the possibilities of
S∗ given his experiential condition, but doesn’t let Jane rule out the possibilities of S
given hers. And, this non-monotonic consequence relation should individuate a further
doxastic attitude, D∗ that it will be rational for John to take up but not Jane. So, D and
D∗ are of incommensurable strength; the rationality of taking up one doesn’t entail
the rationality of taking up the other.62
Some of the doxastic attitudes individuated by non-monotonic consequence rela-
tions are, of course, completely ridiculous.63 There is a doxastic attitude within this
hierarchy that it is rational to take up towards 〈I am a recently disembodied spirit
deceived by a Cartesian demon〉 in the ordinary sort of case where one has a per-
ceptual experience as of one’s hand—at least assuming the latter experience doesn’t
provide conclusive reason rejecting this proposition. This is simply because there is a
way of ranking possibilities by normality so that bizarre possibilities including Carte-
sian demons get ranked the most normal. Belief is obviously not an attitude of this
sort. The non-monotonic consequence relation individuating belief would have to be
characterized by a normality ranking on possibilities that is fairly intuitive; the possi-
61 The framework we are exploring can be enriched. For instance, for any two experiential conditions, e
and e∗, it can be stipulated that e rationalizes a proposition 〈p〉 to at least the same degree as e∗ in the sense
that if a doxastic attitude, D, towards 〈p〉 is epistemically rational on the basis of e∗, it is also epistemically
rational on the basis of e. Such stipulations would have the effect of imposing more order on the envisioned
hierarchy. If such stipulations were made for every pair of experiential conditions and every proposition, the
effect would be a total ordering on doxastic attitudes (so that, once again, a credal scale becomes entirely
appropriate for registering differences in strength of epistemic position).
62 Here, for simplicity and illustrative purposes, we’re ignoring the possibility of enrichment raised in the
previous footnote. In fact, because it can be enriched, our framework does not preclude that the experiential
conditions of Jane and John might make the same doxastic attitudes epistemically rational. The point is that
it allows for the kind of theoretical possibility discussed in text, not that it mandates it.
63 Perhaps in response to this possibility, an anonymous referee worries whether the doxastic states
pluralism we develop will lead to licensing intractable disagreement with distinct rationally held doxastic
attitudes towards contradictory propositions. However, rationally co-held doxastic states from the hierarchy
don’t “clash” in a way required for disagreement—in the way that believing 〈p〉 and rejecting 〈not p〉 don’t
clash despite having contradictory contents.
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ble worlds ranked as more normal by the ranking function for belief really are more
normal. For that reason, rational belief provides a pro tanto reason for acceptance:
because rational beliefs are true in possible worlds that really are more normal, it is
ordinarily reasonable to rely on them in deliberating about what to do.
It is not clearwhether in the envisioned hierarchy therewill be a uniqueweakest dox-
astic attitude such that rationally holding that attitude towards a proposition normally
suffices for rational acceptance of that proposition. This is not just because ‘normally
suffices’ is vague. For example, a number of doxastic attitudes incommensurate in
strength may normally suffice for rational acceptance even though no strictly weaker
attitudes would. We think that this would simply indicate some further indeterminacy
in which among the hierarchy of doxastic attitudes is belief.
Before we move on, it may be helpful to say something more about the relation
between the envisioned hierarchy of doxastic attitudes and Bayesianism. Although the
envisioned hierarchy is only partially ordered by strength, an ideally rational agent
should be able to superimpose a kind of pragmatic credence function for purposes of
decision-making partly on the basis of her doxastic attitudes.64 This may be the best
way to deal with a kind of situation raised earlier: a well-order series of proposed bets
on the truth of 〈p〉 with improving odds. Certainly, the model of doxastic attitudes
under consideration doesn’t prohibit an agent from assigning pragmatic credences
and doing so in accordance with the axioms of probability. Indeed, the model might
naturally be supplemented so as to give some positive guidance as to how to assign
pragmatic credences. For instance, perhaps relatively high pragmatic credence should
be assigned to at least certain propositions that it is rational to believe.65 Presumably,
the model might put other constraints on the assignment of pragmatic credence as
well (or instead). Once pragmatic credence is assigned in conformance with these
constraints, rational decision-making could proceed by calculating expected utilities
in the usual way.
Of course, as alluded to earlier, a pragmatic credence function generally won’t be
uniquely determined from the doxastic representations that it is rational to hold, but
we shouldn’t expect it to be. Some arbitrariness in assigning (any kind of) credence to
a proposition is to be expected once it is conceded that the space of epistemic positions
(as ordered by strength) doesn’t have the structure of the unit interval. If we can’t even
make sense of the idea that some stronger epistemic position, e, is (literally) twice as
strong as another epistemic position, e∗, then the choice of whether or not to register
the difference in strength with a credence that’s twice as large seems arbitrary. Unless
strengths of epistemic position line up with numbers from the unit interval, they likely
won’t dictate a particular assignment of credence. The arbitrariness of the assignment
of credence will obviously carry over to rational decision-making. This is an apparent
64 Cf. Wedgwood (2012).
65 Some restriction on which rationally believed propositions receive high credence is necessary, since,
on the model under consideration, rational belief is closed under multi-premise deduction. A speculative
suggestion: high credence rationally believed propositions might be ones such that the rationality of belief
exhibits less in the way of asymmetrical dependence. Roughly speaking, a rational belief, B, asymmetrically
depends on a rational belief, B∗, just in case if B∗ weren’t rational (because the subject’s experiences were
relevantly different), B wouldn’t be either, but if B weren’t rational (because the subject’s experiences were
relevantly different), B∗ still might be.
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cost of acknowledging that epistemic positions can be of incommensurable strength
(and hence aren’t like real numbers).66
Nevertheless, the assignment of pragmatic credences to propositions on the basis of
doxastic attitudes from the entire hierarchy isn’t nearly as arbitrary as an assignment
merely on the basis of beliefs. The doxastic hierarchy is built to be able to register all
aspects of the strength of one’s epistemic position towards a proposition rather than
merely whether the epistemic position is strong enough for belief to be rational. In
effect, an ideally rational agent will “mirror” the epistemic position she stands in with
respect to a proposition by registering all the doxastic attitudes and withholdings of
doxastic attitudes from the hierarchy that are rational. If this total “mirroring” state
doesn’t uniquely constrain pragmatic credence, it’s simply because the agent’s epis-
temic position doesn’t uniquely constrain pragmatic credence. The total “mirroring”
state will constrain pragmatic credence insofar as the agent’s epistemic position does.
Thus, any pragmatic credence assignment properly based on this total mirroring state
is as good as it gets for decision-making, even if the assignment isn’t uniquely proper.
In any case, the principal point we want to make is that it is possible to embed
the machinery for rational decision-making from the Bayesian framework within the
model of doxastic attitudes that we have been considering. Consequently, reasons
to favor calculating expected utilities as the uniquely ideal way of making rational
decisions are not obviously reasons to reject this model. At same time, reasons to
favor other methods are not necessarily reasons to reject the model either since other
methods of decision-making could be appended to the model instead.67
Furthermore, on this model, epistemic rationality has nothing to do with probabil-
ity. Rather, for a doxastic attitude to be epistemically rational, it must be true in what
are for it all the least abnormal possible worlds compatible with the subject’s expe-
riential condition.68 This is a safety conception of epistemic rationality rather than a
probabilistic one.69 Given this significant departure from anything like probabilism,
it cannot be said that the model of doxastic attitudes under consideration is parasitic
on the Bayesian framework. Together, the two italicized statements in this and the
preceding paragraph suggest that the model under consideration is neither obviously
implausible (at least as an idealization), nor a mere imitation of Bayesianism.
Of course, it doesn’t follow that we should immediately accept the model either.
The model suggests that, at any point of time, an agent is delivered a set of premises—
presumably by his or her experiences up to that point in time—that determine the
rationality of various kinds of doxastic representations by way of their individuating
66 Cf. Joyce (2010).
67 For instance, a generalization of Lin’s (2013) approach. See footnote 54.
68 An anonymous referee pointed out that this theory of epistemic rationality has the alleged problem of
entailing that it is epistemically rational to believe any necessary truth. Ichikawa & Jarvis (2013) argues at
length that the entailed is not, in fact, a genuine problem, but exactly the right result. However, even putting
that issue to the side, this entailment is shared with probabilism and most theories that one might be able
to formalize in principle. Thus, one might take it to be an unintended consequence of an otherwise useful
idealization.
69 See, for instance, Pritchard (2005, 2007) and Sosa (1999) for some representative articulations of a
safety condition. We’re thinking of safety in a fairly formal way (as truth in nearby worlds meeting some
criterion) that doesn’t commit us to any particular doctrine of Pritchard or Sosa.
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non-monotonic consequence relations. But, of course, the deliverance of a premise
set by one’s experiences may well be a point of concern for some.70 And, there
are probably other problems as well. Fortunately, we need not defend this model.
We merely raise it as a theoretical alternative to emphasize that representation-based
epistemology need not imitate credence-based epistemology, which may turn out to
be an advantage rather than a deficit.
§7
In this last section, we will consider a problem for our proposal. The suggestion in
Sect. 5was that belief has the firstwordwhen it comes to rational decision-making. The
implication is that cognizers can largely get along in their rational decision-making by
trafficking inbeliefs.But, belief does not have the lastword.There are certain cases—as
illustrated by car insurance—where a rational agent needs tomove beyond beliefs to
consider other doxastic attitudes. However, this raises the question of how a rational
agent is to keep track of whether it is rational to hold stronger or weaker doxastic
attitudes in order to act rationally in these cases. Must a cognizer simultaneously be
trafficking in these other doxastic attitudes in order to act rationally when these cases
arise? If so, then little advantage is gained by pointing out that a rational agent need
not consider these attitudes ordinarily. If a rational agent has to be managing these
attitudes anyway alongside belief, then cognition is already very taxing.
We think that this problem is not fatal for our proposal. Depending on a rational
agent’s cognitive resources, it may make sense to keep track of some other doxastic
attitudes—e.g. being-sure or suspecting—alongside of beliefs. However, we also think
that a great deal of information about whether to hold other doxastic attitudes towards
a proposition is captured by our system of beliefs. Perhaps this is easiest to see when
the doxastic attitude in question is weaker than belief. It doesn’t seem so far-fetched
to suppose that we can evaluate the plausibility of more speculative theories on the
basis of our beliefs. Presumably, though, this can help us to appreciate whether weaker
doxastic attitudes towards these speculative theories are rational. Notice, though, that
this should also help us to appreciate whether strong doxastic attitudes are rational: if
it is rational to suspect 〈p〉, then this limits how strong a doxastic attitude it would be
rational to take towards 〈not p〉.
Our system of beliefs may also be able to tell us quite a bit about whether to hold
stronger doxastic attitudes becausewe have extensive knowledge about howour belief-
management system works. For instance, we know that beliefs about features in our
environment that are currently visible are of higher quality because visual perception is
fairly dependable. So, stronger doxastic attitudes towards these contents are typically
rational. On the other hand, we know that beliefs that are more removed from imme-
diate perceptual experience tend to be of lower quality as are beliefs that are partly
maintained by memory. So, stronger doxastic attitudes towards these contents may
not be rational. Of course, even beliefs removed from immediate experience can be of
70 Cf. McDowell (1994).We submit that this aspect of the model might be altered at the expense of making
it more baroque; we won’t attempt this alteration here.
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fairly high quality if they have support from multiple sources. Often (even if not very
often) we know something about how beliefs are supported, i.e. we have beliefs about
their credentials. This may allow us to see that stronger doxastic attitudes are, in fact,
rational. Indeed, even if we can’t remember the exact credentials of some particular
belief, we can usually tell quite a bit about which faculties have been involved in man-
aging it by the belief’s content. These discriminatory abilities again tell us something
about whether a stronger doxastic attitude might be rational. Obviously, some infor-
mation about whether to hold stronger doxastic attitudes towards propositions that we
believe is lost, but a surprising amount seems to be stored implicitly by believers who
are—in roughly the sense of Sosa (2011)—reflective. By remembering and otherwise
forming rational beliefs about the sources of belief and the general quality of those
sources, a bounded cognizer can do a fairly good job of determining whether to hold
doxastic attitudes that are stronger than belief.
The upshot is, as we alluded at the end of Sect. 2, that there is a certain sense in
which the answer to the Further Doxastic State Question might very well be “further
beliefs.” Byway of reminder (again), the Further Doxastic State Question is “What are
those further doxastic states that put you in a position to appreciate that some possible
action would be, in fact, rational in cases like car insurance in which, by your own
beliefs, this action isworse?” The answer implicit in Sects. 4– 5 is “thewithholding of a
doxastic attitude that is stronger than belief (but necessary for rationally acting as if the
belief is true given the special circumstances of the case).” However, what we are now
suggesting is that whether to withhold this stronger doxastic attitude might be roughly
determined on the basis of one’s system of beliefs. Consequently, in a certain sense
(that avoids the wrong content problem mentioned in Sect. 2), the further doxastic
states might turn out to be beliefs after all. That obviously would work in favor of
those that emphasize the theoretical importance of belief.
Conclusion
The principal project of this paper is to defuse a certain problem for those that maintain
the theoretical prominence of belief. The problem comes to light when attempting to
account for rational decision-making without making reference to rational credence
(as a way of tracking either rational action or rational belief), particularly in cases with
risky payoff structures (as illustrated by car insurance).
However, at its core, the problem is really that a psychology with only belief and
withholding belief struggles to have the capacity to register all the nuances of the
subject’s epistemic position with respect to any given proposition. We suggest the
problem can be solved by adding to the psychology. Further representational doxastic
attitudes can be used to reflect more about one’s epistemic position. Because they are
representational in the sense that their truth conditions are conditions for accuracy-
entailing correctness, the epistemology of these doxastic attitudes should be very
similar to the epistemology of belief (and unlike the epistemology of credence).
We proposed that ideal rational decision-makingmight draw on these other doxastic
representations. However, whether to hold these different doxastic representations
can often be determined on the basis of one’s beliefs. So, in practice, belief without
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credence might well be enough to account for rational decision-making across a wide
range of cases. Either way, the resulting alternative picture retains the central features
of traditional epistemology—most saliently, an emphasis on truth as a kind of objective
accuracy—while adequately accounting for rational action.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Alston, W. (1985). Concepts of epistemic justification. The Monist, 68(1), 57–89.
Austin, J. L. (1946). Other minds. Proceedings from the Aristotelian Society Supplement, 20, 148–187.
Bradley, D., & Leitgeb, H. (2006). When betting odds and credences come apart: More worries for Dutch
book arguments. Analysis, 66(290), 119–127.
Bratman, M. (1987). Intention, plans and practical reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bratman, M. (1992). Practical reasoning and acceptance in a context. Mind, 101(401), 1–16.
Broome, J. (2013). Rationality through reasoning. Oxford: Blackwell.
Carter, J. A., Jarvis, B., & Katherine, R. (2015).Varieties of Cognitive Achievement. Philosophical Studies,
172(6), 1603–1623.
Chalmers, D. (2011). Frege’s puzzle and the objects of credence. Mind, 120(479), 587–635.
Chalmers, D. (2012). Constructing the world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Christensen, D. (2004). Putting logic in its place: Formal constraints on rational belief. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
David, M. (2001). Truth as the epistemic goal. In M. Steup (Ed.), Knowledge, truth and duty: Essays on
epistemic justification, responsibility and virtue (pp. 151–169). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Descartes, R. (1641/1985). The philosophical writings of descartes (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Dretske, F. (1970). Epistemic operators. Journal of Philosophy, 67(24), 1007–1023.
Dummett, M. (1959). Truth. Proceedings from the Aristotelian Society, 59, 141–162.
Elga, A. (2010). Subjective probabilities should be sharp. Philosopher’s Imprint, 10(5), 1–11.
Engel, P. (1998). Believing, holding true and accepting. Philosophical Explorations, 1(2), 140–151.
Fallis, D. (2006). Epistemic value theory and social epistemology. Episteme, 2(3), 177–188.
Fantl, J., & McGrath, M. (2009). Knowledge in an uncertain world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Foley, R. (1987). The theory of epistemic rationality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Foley, R. (2009). Belief, degrees of belief and the Lockean thesis. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (Eds.),
Degrees of belief (pp. 37–47). Dordrecht: Springer.
Ganson, D. (2008). Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief. Philosophical Studies,
139(3), 441–458.
Gibbard, A. (2005). Truth and correct belief. Philosophical Issues, 15(1), 338–350.
Goldman, A. (1976). Discrimination and perceptual knowledge. Journal of Philosophy, 73(20), 771–791.
Greco, D. (2012). The impossibility of skepticism. Philosophical Review, 121(3), 317–358.
Grimm, S. (2011). On intellectualism in epistemology. Mind, 120(3), 705–733.
Hajek, A. (2008). Dutch book arguments. In P.Anand, P. Pattanaik,&C. Puppe (Eds.),The Oxford handbook
of rational and social choice (pp. 173–195). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hajek, A. A puzzle about degrees of belief. Manuscript.
Hajek, A., & Eriksson, L. (2007). What are degrees of belief? Studia Logica, 86(2), 183–213.
Harman, G. (1986). Change in view: Principles of reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hawthorne, J., & Stanley, J. (2008). Knowledge and action. Journal of Philosophy, 105(10), 571–590.
Hill, C., & Schechter, J. (2007). Hawthorne’s lottery puzzle and the nature of belief. Philosophical Issues,
17(1), 102–122.
Huber, F. (2012). Formal representations of belief. In Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, Fall.
123
2350 Synthese (2016) 193:2323–2351
Ichikawa, J. J. (2012). Knowledge norms and acting well. Thought, 1(1), 49–55.
Ichikawa, J. J., & Jarvis, B. (2013). The Rules of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ichikawa, J. J., Jarvis, B., & Katherine, R. (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology.
Analytic Philosophy, 53(4), 327–343.
James, W. (1897). The will to believe. New York: Longmans, Green and Company.
Jarvis, B. (2012). The Dual Aspects Theory of Truth. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 42, 209–233.
Jarvis, B., & Katherine, R. (2015). The Evaluative and Normative Roles of Knowledge (Manuscript).
Jeffrey, R. (1990). The logic of decision. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Joyce, J. M. (1998). A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism. Philosophy of Science, 65(4), 575–603.
Joyce, J. M. (2010). A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision-making. Philosophical
Perspectives, 24, 281–323.
Kaplan, M. (1996). Decision theory as philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kaplan, M. (2009). Williamson’s casual approach to probabilism. In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (Eds.),
Williamson on knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kelly, T. (2013). Evidence can be permissive. In M. Steup & J. Turri (Eds.), Contemporary debates in
epistemology (pp. 298–312). Oxford: Blackwell.
Lange, M. (1999). Calibration and the epistemological role of Bayesian conditionalization. Journal of
Philosophy, 96(6), 294–324.
Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, D. (1996). Elusive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(4), 549–567.
Lin, H. (2013). Foundations of everyday practical reasoning. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 42(6), 831–
862.
Lynch, M. P. (2009). Truth as one and many. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Makinson, D. (2005). Bridges from classical to nonmonotonic logic. London: King’s College Publications.
McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Moss, S. (2013). Epistemology formalized. Philosophical Review, 122(1), 1–43.
Pritchard,D. (2010). Relevant alternatives, perceptual knowledge and discrimination.Noûs, 44(2), 245–268.
Pritchard, D. (2005). Epistemic luck. Oxford University Press.
Pritchard, D. (2007). Anti-luck epistemology. Synthese, 158(3), 277–297.
Pryor, J. Uncertainty and undermining. Manuscript.
Ramsey, F. (1931). Truth and probability. In R. Braithwhite (Ed.), The foundations of mathematics and
other logical essays (pp. 156–198). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Reed, B. (2010). A defense of stable invariantism. Noûs, 44(2), 224–244.
Ross, J., & Schroeder, M. (2012). Belief, credence and pragmatic encroachment. Philosophy and Phenom-
enological Research. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00552.x.
Shah, N. (2003). How truth governs belief. Philosophical Review, 112(4), 447–482.
Shah, N., & Velleman, J. D. (2005). Doxastic deliberation. Philosophical Review, 114(4), 497–534.
Skyrms, B. (1980). Higher order degrees of belief. In D. H. Mellor (Ed.), Prospects for pragmatism (pp.
109–137). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, M. (2010). What else justification could be. Noûs, 44(1), 10–31.
Sosa, E. (1999). How to defeat opposition to Moore. Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 137–149.
Sosa, E. (2011). Reflective knowledge: Apt belief and reflective knowledge (Vol. 2). Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Staffel, J. (2012). Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief? Synthese, 190(16), 3535–3551.
Stanley, J. (2005). Knowledge and practical interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Steglich-Peterson, A. (2006). No norm is needed: On the aim of belief. Philosophical Quarterly, 56(225),
499–516.
Sturgeon, S. (2008). Reason and the grain of belief. Noûs, 42(1), 139–165.
Turri, J. (2010). Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism.Philosophical Review, 119(1), 77–95.
van Fraassen, B. (1983). Calibration: A frequency justification for personal probability. In R. S. Cohen &
L. Laudan (Eds.), Physics, philosophy and psychoanalysis (pp. 295–319). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
van Fraassen, B. (1984). Belief and the will. Journal of Philosophy, 81(5), 235–256.
Velleman, J. D. (2000). The possibility of practical reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weatherson, B. (2005). Can we do without pragmatic encroachment? Philosophical Perspectives, 19(1),
417–443.
Wedgwood, R. (2002). The aim of belief. Noûs, 36(16), 267–297.
Wedgwood, R. (2007). The nature of normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
123
Synthese (2016) 193:2323–2351 2351
Wedgwood, R. (2012). Outright belief. Dialectica, 66(3), 309–329.
Weisberg, J. Belief: Full and partial. Manuscript.
White, R. (2005). Epistemic permissiveness. Philosophical Perspectives, 19(1), 445–459.
White, R. (2009). Evidential symmetry and mushy credence. In T. Szabo-Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.),
Oxford studies in epistemology (Vol. 3, pp. 161–189). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Whiting, D. (2010). Should I believe the truth? Dialectica, 64(2), 213–224.
Williamson, T. (1998). Conditionalizing on knowledge.British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 49(1),
89–121.
Williamson, T. (2002). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wright, C. (1992). Truth and objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
123
